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INTRODUCTION 
The racing world breathed a long sigh of relief on May 22, 2008—
the date on which Bruton Smith, Chairman of Speedway Motorsports 
Inc. (SMI), announced his intention to purchase Kentucky Speedway.1  
For the previous two years, Kentucky Speedway had been engaged in a 
bitter antitrust battle against NASCAR involving the latter’s refusal to 
award it a lucrative NEXTEL Cup race,2 and it appeared that all of the 
necessary pieces were finally in place for a settlement agreement to be 
reached.  Kentucky Speedway had lost at the trial level,3 it was hemorr-
haging money, and its investors were desperately trying to sell the 
speedway.4  Thus, when Bruton Smith effectively conditioned the acqui-
sition of the speedway on the lawsuit between Kentucky and NASCAR 
ending,5 it seemed as though the three entities would naturally work to-
gether on a settlement that would be in all of their best interests.  NAS-
CAR could avoid the costs of an appeal, Bruton Smith could acquire the 
 
1 Marty Smith, Key NASCAR Track Owner to Buy Kentucky Speedway, ESPN.COM, May 
23, 2008, http://sports.espn.go.com/rpm/nascar/cup/news/story?id=3407605. 
2 See Ky. Speedway, LLC v. NASCAR, No. 05-0138, 2008 WL 113987, at *1 (E.D. Ky. 
Jan. 7, 2008), aff’d, 588 F.3d 908 (6th Cir. 2009).     
3 See id. at *8 (granting NASCAR’s motion for summary judgment). 
4 The investors were willing to sell the track for half of the price that they had  
paid to construct it.  See NASCAR Says It’s Too Late to Add Kentucky to 2009 Schedule, 
CBSSPORTS.COM, May 23, 2008, http://www.cbssports.com/autoracing/story/10839377 
(“Smith has not yet completed the speedway purchase, in which he agreed to pay $78.3 
million for the track that cost $152 million to build.”).  This desperation was under-
standable given the large debt that the speedway had incurred.  See Bob Pockrass,  
SMI:  We Haven’t Made Decision on Kentucky Speedway Transaction, BUS. COURIER (Cin-
cinnati), Aug. 7, 2008, http://cincinnati.bizjournals.com/cincinnati/stories/2008/08/ 
04/daily43.html (noting that the $78 million deal with SMI would include “$63 million 
in debt assumption”). 
5 While Bruton Smith was interested in Kentucky Speedway for its potential value in 
holding a NEXTEL Cup race, NASCAR continually stressed that it would not consider 
sanctioning such a race until its litigation with the previous owners of Kentucky Speed-
way was resolved.  See Pockrass, supra note 4 (“Smith has said that as long as the current 
owners continue their lawsuit, he cannot realign a race date to Kentucky.”).  Smith in-
cluded a provision in the acquisition contract allowing SMI to back out of the deal with-
in ninety days, see id., and he knew that his success in obtaining the race  
depended on the resolution of the lawsuit.  See Bob Pockrass, Smith Not Saying Which  
SMI Track Could Lose Date to Kentucky, SCENEDAILY.COM, June 17, 2008, http:// 
www.scenedaily.com/news/articles/nationwideseries/Smith_not_saying_which_SMI_track
_could_lose_date_to_Kentucky.html (reporting Smith’s acknowledgment that, in order to 
get the race that he wanted, “the key would be for the current Kentucky Speedway 
ownership group to settle or drop its federal antitrust lawsuit against NASCAR”).   
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speedway for a fraction of its value, and Kentucky Speedway’s share-
holders could be bailed out of their failing investment. 
Given the prevalence of settlement in federal lawsuits,6 the parties’ 
lawyers were likely quite familiar with an immediate concern of their 
clients—ensuring that their statements to the opposing party over the 
course of settlement negotiations would not expose them to future 
liability.7  The lawyers likely turned to Federal Rule of Evidence 4088 to 
explore the specific protection that their clients could enjoy during 
the course of the settlement proceedings.  There is a wealth of case 
law and academic literature to which these practitioners may have 
turned for answers concerning the application of this Rule to settle-
ment communications between the parties,9 and it is clear that it would 
have afforded protection to such communications directly between 
NASCAR and Kentucky Speedway.10   
An interesting issue must have surfaced, however, when the practi-
tioners considered the consequences of Bruton Smith—a nonparty to 
the litigation—being involved in the settlement proceedings.  Neither 
the most thorough inspection of the Rule nor the most detailed analysis 
of its accompanying advisory note would have yielded a sufficient an-
swer to the question whether communications between Bruton Smith 
and one of the parties to the litigation, in furtherance of settlement 
with the other party, would have been protected.11  Such a settlement 
 
6 See, e.g., Robert G. Bone & David S. Evans, Class Certification and the Substantive 
Merits, 51 DUKE L.J. 1251, 1285 n.129 (2002) (“[B]y most estimates, approximately se-
venty percent of all cases filed in federal court end in pretrial settlement.”). 
7 See Fred S. Hjelmeset, Impeachment of Party by Prior Inconsistent Statement in Com-
promise Negotiations:  Admissibility Under Federal Rule of Evidence 408, 43 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 
75, 110 (1995) (“[T]he almost unavoidable impact of disclosure about compromise is 
that juries will consider the evidence as a concession of liability, and the tendency of 
juries to disregard instructions is so well known that the admission of the evidence for 
even a limited purpose would result in a frustration of the policy of encouraging set-
tlements.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (footnote omitted)).   
8 Rule 408 describes the conditions under which statements made in the course of 
settlement negotiations are inadmissible.   
9 See, e.g., Wayne D. Brazil, Protecting the Confidentiality of Settlement Negotiations, 39 
HASTINGS L.J. 955, 957-82 (1988) (exploring the scope and limitations of Rule 408’s 
protection of communications made between parties to a litigation). 
10 See FED. R. EVID. 408(a) (noting the conditions under which “conduct or state-
ments made in compromise negotiations regarding the claim” are “not admissible on 
behalf of any party”). 
11 Specifically, the issue is whether communications to a nonparty (e.g., Bruton 
Smith) in furtherance of settlement would constitute “compromise negotiations” and 
thus warrant protection under the Rule—an issue on which the Rule is silent. 
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scenario would arguably further the policy goals underlying the Rule12 
and be enormously advantageous to everyone involved.  There is no 
case law, though, to guide practitioners encountering such a situation, 
and the academic literature is similarly silent. 
When confronted with this issue, practitioners are thus forced ei-
ther to forgo potentially beneficial interactions with third parties 
(people like Bruton Smith) or to proceed with an imperfect under-
standing of their clients’ potential exposure to liability resulting from 
admissions or concessions made in such communications.  This void 
in both the literature and the case law is particularly troubling given 
the increasing complexity of settlement negotiations and the underly-
ing disputes.  In addition, given the growth of mergers and acquisi-
tions and the involvement of third-party “specialists”13 to whom parties 
convey a wide variety of sensitive information, the Bruton Smith ex-
ample might even begin to seem relatively simple.  Practitioners are 
responsible for protecting their clients from harm during the course 
of settlement proceedings, and it is essential that the issue of nonparty 
communications be clarified in order to provide practitioners with 
necessary direction. 
This Comment presents an initial analysis of the applicability of 
Rule 408 to communications made by a party to a nonparty in fur-
therance of a settlement with another party to the dispute.14  Given the 
lack of direct authority regarding this issue, I rely on a textual analysis 
of the Rule itself, an examination of the public policy considerations 
motivating the Rule’s enactment, and an analysis of the applicability 
of this Rule to other, similar situations within the jurisdiction of the 
federal courts of appeals, in order to provide recommendations to 
practitioners facing this issue. 
In Part I, I present an overview of the origins and foundations of 
the Rules concerning the secrecy of settlement communications and 
offer a brief description of some of the issues resulting from the Rules’ 
 
12 See infra Section II.B.  
13 Joseph H. Flom, Mergers & Acquisitions:  The Decade in Review, 54 U. MIAMI L. 
REV. 753, 773-74 (2000). 
14 For shorthand, this Comment sometimes refers to this simply as “the issue.”  
The Comment will also briefly discuss the settlement privilege recently acknowledged, 
under Rule 501, by the Sixth Circuit.  See Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Chiles Power 
Supply, Inc., 332 F.3d 976, 981 (6th Cir. 2003) (“The public policy favoring secret ne-
gotiations, combined with the inherent questionability of the truthfulness of any 
statements made therein, leads us to conclude that a settlement privilege should exist 
. . . .”).  Because the Sixth Circuit is the only circuit in which the privilege applies, 
though, this Comment will largely focus on the general applicability of Rule 408.    
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ambiguity.  I then argue that the applicability of these Rules to non-
parties involved with settlement negotiations has yet to be adequately 
addressed, note the probable reasons for this being the case, and re-
flect on the necessity of a swift resolution to this failure. 
In Part II, I engage in a textual, policy-based, and common law 
analysis of the applicability of Rule 408 to nonparty settlement com-
munications under the jurisdiction of the federal courts of appeals.  
In so doing, I find that the terms of the Rule, its underlying policy, 
and its current application to analogous cases suggest that the federal 
circuits would look favorably upon protecting nonparty communica-
tions in furtherance of settlement. 
In Part III, I present circuit-specific recommendations to practi-
tioners based on the results of my analysis in Part II.  I argue that prac-
titioners should feel most comfortable engaging in nonparty settle-
ment communications in the Third, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Eleventh 
Circuits; that practitioners should feel less, but still reasonably, com-
fortable engaging in such communications in the First and Ninth Cir-
cuits; and that there is insufficient case law upon which to base a con-
clusion in the Second, Fourth, Seventh, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits.  
Finally, I argue that because the federal courts of appeals have ac-
knowledged a broad policy of encouraging the settlement of lawsuits 
under Rule 408, it would not be inherently unreasonable for parties to 
engage in such communications—even in the more ambiguous cir-
cuits—when the communications would be particularly advantageous. 
I.  PROTECTING THE DRIVERS:  THE FEDERAL RULES CONCERNING THE  
SECRECY OF SETTLEMENT COMMUNICATIONS  
Before I analyze the applicability of the Rules concerning the 
secrecy of settlement negotiations to nonparties to a litigation, it is 
important to understand both the context in which these Rules arose 
and the current issues resulting from their ambiguity.  I explain the 
absence of an adequate discussion of the issue and emphasize the im-
portance of reaching a resolution. 
A.  Rule 408 
Federal Rule of Evidence 408, entitled “Compromise and Offers to 
Compromise,” concerns the admissibility of settlement offers and other 
communications made during the course of settlement negotiations.15  
 
15 FED. R. EVID. 408. 
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It provides, in its current amended form, that “offering . . . or accept-
ing . . . valuable consideration in compromising or attempting to com-
promise [a] claim” and “conduct or statements made in compromise 
negotiations regarding [a] claim” are “not admissible on behalf of any 
party, when offered to prove liability for, invalidity of, or amount of a 
claim that was disputed as to validity or amount, or to impeach through 
a prior inconsistent statement or contradiction.”16 
The Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules has noted two princip-
al motivations behind the enactment of Rule 408:  First, the Rule seeks 
to guard against the admission of statements made in compromise ne-
gotiations because of the statements’ questionable evidentiary value; as 
settlement is often “motivated by a desire for peace rather than from 
any concession of weakness of position,” the use of these statements in 
another context may be highly misleading.17  Second, the Rule seeks to 
further the general public policy of encouraging settlement of law-
suits.18  Successful settlement negotiations are vital to ensuring that the 
federal courts remain productive and efficient, and Rule 408 attempts 
to encourage settlement discourse by freeing individuals from the worry 
that their statements may expose them to future liability. 
As is the case with many of the Rules of Evidence, the federal 
courts have yet to implement a consistent judicial philosophy regard-
ing the proper scope and application of Rule 408,19 and the Supreme 
Court has yet to produce an opinion addressing the Rule.  Given that 
settlement negotiations are involved in most federal lawsuits,20 the 
academic community has understandably developed a keen interest in 
attending to the various ambiguities inherent in Rule 408.  There has 
been a wealth of scholarship concerning the types of settlement com-
munications covered by the Rule and the safeguards that parties must 
employ in order to ensure the Rule’s applicability to the precise cir-
cumstances of their litigation.21 
 
16 Id.  
17 FED. R. EVID. 408 advisory committee’s note.  
18 Id.  
19 See Constar Int’l, Inc. v. Ball Plastic Container Corp., No. 05-0669, 2006 WL 
6021150, at *1 (W.D. Wis. Mar. 27, 2006) (“Courts are all over the map on how to ap-
ply Rule 408.”). 
20 See supra note 6 and accompanying text.  
21 See, e.g., Brazil, supra note 9, at 955, 957-82 (discussing “how far [Rule 408’s] 
promise of confidentiality extends and the circumstances under which it would permit 
communications made during settlement negotiations to be admitted into evidence at 
trial”); Mikah K. Story Thompson, To Speak or Not to Speak?  Navigating the Treacherous 
Waters of Parallel Investigations Following the Amendment of Federal Rule of Evidence 408, 76 
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Such scholarship, however, has generally been limited to the con-
text of negotiations taking place directly between two adverse parties 
to a litigation.  Even when the issue of nonparties has been broached 
in the literature and case law, it has only been with regard to ancillary 
third parties entering into a preexisting dispute and bringing their 
own claims against the defendant.  The situation is generally as fol-
lows:  Party A is involved in a lawsuit with Party B.  Nonparty C consid-
ers engaging in its own litigation against B arising out of the lawsuit 
between A and B, and then B and C settle.  A now wants both to dis-
cover and to admit evidence of the terms of this settlement agreement 
or communications made therein.  The courts have clearly held, how-
ever, that the admission of such evidence is barred by Rule 408.22  Al-
though the settlement agreement between B and C arose out of the 
lawsuit between A and B, it is still a “compromise negotiation[]”23 with-
in the scope of the Rule. 
This example, of course, is distinct from a situation in which a par-
ty to a litigation communicates with a nonparty in furtherance of a set-
tlement with another party.  In the latter situation, B and C are not en-
gaged in any dispute arising from the original lawsuit and are not 
communicating in hopes of reaching a settlement agreement between 
themselves.  Rather, B is communicating with C in the hope of coming 
to an agreement with A.  The interesting issue, then, is whether the 
scope of Rule 408 extends to “conduct or statements made in com-
promise negotiations”24 when B is not compromising with C but rather 
is communicating with C in order to further her compromise negotia-
tion with A.  That is, does the protection of Rule 408 extend to com-
munications made by a party involved in a lawsuit to a nonparty when 
such communications are in furtherance of a settlement with another 
party to the dispute? 
Unfortunately, both Rule 408 and its accompanying advisory notes 
are silent on this issue, and neither the academic literature nor case 
law provides any sufficient discussion of the issue.  This void may be 
due to a variety of different factors.  With regard to an absence of case 
 
U. CIN. L. REV. 939, 940 (2008) (discussing Rule 408’s inapplicability to statements 
made to government officials during settlement negotations and how this “creates an 
inconspicuous trap awaiting any person who is the subject of a civil investigation by a 
governmental body,” as “admissions of fault made during those settlement talks can 
become the basis for a later criminal proceeding”).   
22 See, e.g., United States v. Contra Costa County Water Dist., 678 F.2d 90, 91-92 
(9th Cir. 1982).   
23 FED. R. EVID. 408.  
24 Id.  
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law, it may be that parties are unlikely to communicate with nonpar-
ties in furtherance of a settlement with another party precisely be-
cause they are unaware of their potential liabilities for doing so.  As to 
the void in the literature, it may be that the wealth of other uncertain-
ties concerning the scope and application of Rule 40825 has led to a 
broader academic discourse surrounding the Rule.   
Regardless of the specific reasons for the absence of a significant 
discussion of this issue, such a failure must quickly be resolved.  Set-
tlement negotiations are becoming as complicated and far-reaching as 
the transactions and disputes at their foundation, and interested third 
parties are increasingly attempting to become involved in their resolu-
tion.  Indeed, settlement negotiations surrounding mergers and ac-
quisitions—a context in which this issue is likely to arise—have never 
been as complex as they have become in recent history.  Practitioners 
are currently forced either to forgo potentially beneficial communica-
tions with nonparties or to participate in such communications with 
an imperfect understanding of their resulting potential for future lia-
bility under Rule 408.  The scope of Rule 408’s protection in this area 
must be explored and clarified in order to provide direction to practi-
tioners accountable for the course of settlement negotiations. 
B.  Rule 501 and the Settlement Privilege 
While not the focus of this Comment, a discussion of the Rules 
protecting the secrecy of settlement negotiations would be incomplete 
without an introduction to the newly acknowledged settlement privi-
lege under Rule 501.  Unlike Rule 408’s concern with the admissibility 
of evidence, Rule 501 provides the general guidelines by which courts 
may recognize the existence of privileges preventing the very discovera-
bility of evidence.  The broad language of Rule 501 states that the rec-
ognition of privileges “shall be governed by the principles of the com-
mon law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States 
in the light of reason and experience,” except as otherwise required by 
the laws of the United States.26  The Supreme Court has noted that 
Rule 501 allows the federal courts to recognize privileges not previous-
ly enjoyed under the common law so long as the recognition promotes 
 
25 See, e.g., Jeffrey J. Lauderdale, A New Trend in the Law of Privilege:  The Federal Set-
tlement Privilege and the Proper Use of Federal Rule of Evidence 501 for the Recognition of New 
Privileges, 35 U. MEM. L. REV. 255, 306-09 (2005) (discussing various uncertainties 
raised when trying to reconcile Rule 408 with the settlement privilege). 
26 FED. R. EVID. 501. 
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a public interest that is “sufficiently important . . . to outweigh the need 
for probative evidence”27 and the recognition is consistent with the 
“reason and experience” of federal jurisprudence.28 
In Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Chiles Power Supply, Inc., the Sixth 
Circuit became the first circuit to recognize the existence of a general 
“settlement privilege” under Rule 501.29  The issue before the court 
was “whether statements made in furtherance of settlement are privi-
leged and protected from third-party discovery” when a plaintiff 
sought discovery of communications made during settlement negotia-
tions between the two defendants to his claim.30  While the court rea-
dily noted that Rule 408 was not on point because it applies to admis-
sibility and not discoverability, it elected to recognize a general set-
settlement privilege under Rule 501.31  Having analyzed the historical 
development of various protections for settlement communications in 
the common law, the court stated that “[v]iewed in the light of reason 
and experience, we believe a settlement privilege serves a sufficiently 
important public interest, and therefore should be recognized.”32  The 
court thus denied discovery of the statements made in furtherance of 
the settlement negotiations.33 
While this settlement privilege goes beyond Rule 408’s provision 
of inadmissibility and makes settlement communications undiscovera-
ble, the policy goals inherent in the Goodyear court’s recognition of 
the privilege are identical to the policy goals underlying Rule 408:  
encouraging the settlement of lawsuits34 and shielding from discovery 
potentially misleading and contextually driven statements.35 
In addition to sharing similar purposes with Rule 408, the settle-
ment privilege has similar ambiguities.  As with Rule 408, the federal 
 
27 Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980). 
28 See, e.g., Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 15 (1996) (holding that communications 
made between patient and psychotherapist are privileged). 
29 332 F.3d 976, 980 (6th Cir. 2003). 
30 Id. at 977. 
31 Id. at 979-81. 
32 Id. at 980 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
33 Id. at 983.  
34 Compare id. at 980 (“The ability to negotiate and settle a case without trial fosters 
a more efficient, more cost-effective, and significantly less burdened judicial system.  In 
order for settlement talks to be effective, parties must feel uninhibited in their com-
munications.”), with supra text accompanying note 18. 
35 Compare 332 F.3d at 981 (recognizing that settlement negotiations frequently 
include “puffing and posturing” and that allowing discovery of such statements “would 
be highly misleading if allowed to be used for purposes other than settlement” (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted)), with supra text accompanying note 17.  
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courts have yet to adopt a consistent philosophy regarding the nature 
of the settlement privilege.36  Most significantly, the Sixth Circuit is cur-
rently the only circuit even to acknowledge its existence.37  While most 
courts have simply failed to reach the issue of this privilege on the me-
rits,38 a number of them have outright rejected the privilege, arguing 
that the Sixth Circuit’s conclusion was unjustified.39  And, even where 
the existence of this privilege is accepted, there is no clear consensus 
among the district courts as to its proper scope and application.40  The 
broad language of the Goodyear holding41 and the absence of advisory 
committee notes to aid in Rule 501’s interpretation leave the settle-
ment privilege riddled with even more uncertainties than Rule 408. 
It is not surprising, given its similar purpose and ambiguity, that is-
sues pertaining to the settlement privilege have enjoyed the same 
wealth of discourse in the literature as those involving its Rule 408 
counterpart.42  There has been a great deal of debate within the aca-
demic community as to the specific types of settlement communications 
 
36 Compare Lauderdale, supra note 25, at 306-13 (discussing several “issues [that] 
exist regarding the substantive scope and application of the [settlement] privilege”), 
with supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
37 Cf. Lauderdale, supra note 25, at 259 (“In [Goodyear] the Sixth Circuit became 
the first federal court to recognize a ‘settlement privilege’—a privilege between ad-
verse parties for communications made at the bargaining table while attempting to set-
tle a dispute.”). 
38 See, e.g., United States v. Williams Cos., 562 F.3d 387, 398 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (de-
clining to address the issue of settlement privilege because it was not properly raised in 
the district court); In re Subpoena Duces Tecum Issued to Commodity Futures Trading 
Comm’n, 439 F.3d 740, 742, 754 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (deeming “premature” a considera-
tion of the merits of the settlement-privilege claim because the party claiming the privi-
lege failed to meet its burden of showing that the allegedly protected documents were 
a part of settlement negotiations). 
39 See Ray v. BlueHippo Funding, LLC, No. 06-1807, 2008 WL 3399392, at *1 (N.D. 
Cal. Aug. 11, 2008) (refusing to acknowledge a federal settlement privilege); Bd. of 
Trs. of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Tyco Int’l Ltd., 253 F.R.D. 521, 523 (C.D. 
Cal. 2008) (same); Newman & Assocs. v. J.K. Harris & Co., No. 04-9264, 2005 WL 
3610140, at *2-3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 2005) (“Under federal law, courts have generally 
declined to recognize a privilege that would preclude discovery for the purpose of set-
tlements or settlement negotiations. . . . To the extent that defendants rely on the exis-
tence of such a privilege, their argument fails as a matter of law.”).  
40 See Irwin Seating Co. v. IBM Corp., No. 04-0568, 2007 WL 518866, at *3-4 (W.D. 
Mich. Feb. 15, 2007) (holding that, while Goodyear did not provide direct guidance on 
the issue, a magistrate judge’s decision to strike the plaintiff’s expert testimony because 
the plaintiff had revealed to the experts confidential information obtained during 
mediation before the experts testified was not clearly erroneous or unduly harsh).    
41 See Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Chiles Power Supply, Inc., 332 F.3d 976, 983 
(6th Cir. 2003) (“In sum, any communications made in furtherance of settlement are 
privileged.”). 
42 See supra note 21 and accompanying text.  
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covered by the Rule,43 the exact degree to which such communications 
can be disclosed,44 and the safeguards that a party must employ in order 
to ensure the applicability of the privilege to the party’s litigation.45  
There is controversy as to whether the Sixth Circuit was even justified in 
creating the privilege, with some academics contending that the court’s 
historical analysis was inaccurate and its general reasoning inadequate.46 
The contours of such scholarship, however, have likewise been li-
mited to the context of settlement negotiations taking place directly 
between two adverse parties to litigation.  There has been no discus-
sion in the courts or in the literature about whether the settlement 
privilege extends to communications made by a party involved in a 
lawsuit to a nonparty when such communications are in furtherance of 
a party’s settlement.  In the Rule 501 context, however, the reasons for 
the lack of discourse are far clearer than in the case of Rule 408.  Giv-
en the groundbreaking nature of the settlement privilege, its adoption 
only seven years ago, and the current circuit split regarding its accep-
tance, far more pressing concerns regarding the acknowledgment of 
this privilege47 have diverted the attention of courts and scholars alike. 
The academic interest in the “bigger picture” presented by the set-
tlement privilege, however, does nothing to address the specific con-
cerns of everyday practitioners who are responsible for guiding clients 
in their communications with nonparties.  As in situations involving 
Rule 408, these practitioners are currently forced either to forgo poten-
tially beneficial communications with nonparties or to participate in 
such communications with an imperfect understanding of the commu-
nications’ discoverability.  Clients negotiating with extremely sensitive 
information may not be content knowing that their communications 
 
43 See, e.g., Lauderdale, supra note 25, at 309-10 (noting that Goodyear left open the 
precise definition of “settlement negotiations” and that it remains unsettled “whether 
the privilege applies to forms of alternative dispute resolution such as mediation or 
arbitration”).  
44 See id. at 308-09 (arguing that Goodyear intended to create a privilege against dis-
covery but that disclosure should also be barred).  
45 See id. at 306-07 (noting that “it is unclear to what extent one [party] can pre-
vent the disclosure of communications by the other” and that “it remains an open 
question as to what happens should one party disregard the privilege and reveal such 
information to a third party”). 
46 See, e.g., Thompson, supra note 21, at 985-88 (discussing the controversy over 
whether the Goodyear court correctly applied precedent in reaching its ruling).    
47 For a discussion of such concerns—including “whether and how the settlement 
privilege can be reconciled with the provisions in Rule 408,” how “settlement negotia-
tion” should be defined, and “whether the privilege can attach before litigation”—see 
Lauderdale, supra note 25, at 305-13.   
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may be inadmissible but perhaps discoverable, and they certainly do not 
appreciate the ambiguity.  The scope of the settlement privilege’s pro-
tection of communications made by a party to a nonparty must be ex-
plored and clarified in order to provide sufficient direction for practi-
tioners responsible for taking such issues into account. 
In sum, while there has been a great deal of discussion surround-
ing both Rule 408 and the settlement privilege, it has been limited to 
issues regarding settlement communications directly between parties 
to a dispute.  There has yet to be any significant headway in either the 
academic literature or the case law concerning application of either 
Rule 408 or the privilege to communications made by a party to a 
nonparty in furtherance of a settlement with another party.  Given the 
mounting complexity of settlement negotiations and the increasing 
demand for nonparty involvement in such compromises, it is essential 
that this void in the literature be addressed by a developing discussion 
that takes the issue of nonparty settlement communications seriously. 
II.  NAVIGATING THE TRACK:  NONPARTY SETTLEMENT  
COMMUNICATIONS IN THE COURTS OF APPEALS 
Having acknowledged this dearth of discourse, I now analyze the 
applicability of Rule 408 to communications made by a party to a 
nonparty in furtherance of settlement with another party.  In doing 
so, I find that the terms of the Rule, its underlying policy, and its cur-
rent application to analogous situations within the jurisdiction of the 
federal courts of appeals suggest that its protections apply to these 
communications.  Because the settlement privilege arose from the 
same policy considerations underlying Rule 408, I will at times discuss 
the privilege in order to further elucidate the discussion. 
A.  Textual Analysis 
The textual provisions of Rule 408 are not facially limited to set-
tlement communications between parties to a litigation.  In fact, the 
terms suggest a broad scope of protection for communications made 
in furtherance of settlement, without restrictions on the recipient of 
such communications.  That is, Rule 408 seems more concerned with 
the nature of what is said than with to whom it is said; it simply protects 
communications made in furtherance of settlement. 
For instance, Rule 408 states that offers “attempting to compro-
mise [a] claim” and “conduct or statements made in compromise ne-
gotiations regarding [a] claim” are to be afforded the Rule’s protec-
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tion.48  In tying the Rule’s protection to the type of communication 
made rather than to the relationship between the speaker and the re-
cipient of the communication, the drafters of Rule 408 may have an-
ticipated situations in which compromise negotiations would not 
merely be directly between the parties to the dispute.  In fact, evi-
dence scholars have noted that the choice of words employed by the 
Rule suggests that it was intended to have a significantly broader scope 
than a literal application would provide.49 
Similarly, the settlement privilege articulated by the Goodyear court 
appears to have been focused more on the nature of the settlement 
communication than on its recipient.  Nowhere did the court state or 
imply that the settlement privilege should be construed as limited to 
communications made directly between the parties; rather, its reason-
ing focused on offering protection to settlement communications sur-
rounding the claim itself.  In fact, the court broadly concluded that 
“any communications made in furtherance of settlement are privi-
leged.”50  Such an expansive statement appears to entail that commu-
nications in furtherance of settlement, regardless of the relationship 
between the parties, are to be privileged. 
The fact that Rule 408 and the settlement privilege appear to focus 
on the nature of a communication rather than on the individual to 
whom it was made lends support to the proposition that communica-
tions made to a nonparty, so long as they were in furtherance of a set-
tlement with a party to the dispute, would be both inadmissible and 
privileged to the extent that the Rules otherwise applied.51  However, it 
is also important to note that, given the inherent ambiguity of the text, 
the mere fact that the text is consistent with such an interpretation 
does not necessarily mean that the Rules were intended to encompass 
such a situation.  I thus turn away from a facial evaluation of these 
Rules and toward an examination of their foundational principles. 
 
48 FED. R. EVID. 408(a) (emphasis added).  
49 See, e.g., JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S EVIDENCE 
MANUAL, STUDENT EDITION § 7.05[1][b] (8th ed. 2007) (“If either [party] makes an 
offer of compromise to a person other than the other potential litigant, the offer 
should be protected by exclusionary treatment.”).   
50 Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Chiles Power Supply, Inc., 332 F.3d 976, 983 
(6th Cir. 2003). 
51 Rule 408(b) identifies an example of when the Rules would nonetheless not ap-
ply:  exclusion is not required for evidence “offered for purposes not prohibited by sub-
division (a),” such as “proving a witness’s bias or prejudice; negating a contention of 
undue delay; and proving an effort to obstruct a criminal investigation or prosecution.”   
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B.  Foundational Policy 
While the scope of Rule 408 is far from clear, the public policy 
motivations at its foundation suggest that communications by a party 
to a nonparty to further settlement with another party ought to be 
protected.  Such communications would be equally suspect as a means 
by which to assess a party’s liability, and their protection would signifi-
cantly further the general public policy of encouraging settlement in 
order to promote judicial efficiency. 
1.  Avoiding Reliance on Statements of Suspect Evidentiary Value 
In Part I, it was noted that one of the principal motivations behind 
the enactment of Rule 408 was to guard against the admission of 
statements made in compromise negotiations because of the state-
ments’ questionable evidentiary value.52  Because an offer to settle is 
often “motivated by a desire for peace rather than from any conces-
sion of weakness of position,” the use of statements made during 
compromise negotiations in another context may be highly mislead-
ing.53  The Goodyear court, in describing its motivation for acknowledg-
ing a settlement privilege, similarly noted that there is an “inherent 
questionability of the truthfulness of any statements made” during 
compromise negotiations,54 as parties may make admissions or engage 
in conduct in order to bring peace for the “unique purpose of settle-
ment negotiations.”55 
 
52 See supra text accompanying note 17. 
53 FED. R. EVID. 408 advisory committee’s note.  The federal courts of appeals have 
similarly acknowledged the importance of this policy.  See, e.g., EEOC v. UMB Bank Fin. 
Corp., 558 F.3d 784, 791 (8th Cir. 2009) (noting that one of the primary purposes of the 
rule is “to guard against the admission of evidence that may not fairly represent the ac-
tual value or merits of a claim” (citing FED. R. EVID. 408 advisory committee’s note)); 
United States v. Arias, 431 F.3d 1327, 1337 (11th Cir. 2005) (noting that “the evidence is 
irrelevant, as the compromise at issue may have been motivated by a desire for peace 
rather than any concession as to the merits of the party’s position” (citing FED. R. EVID. 
408 advisory committee’s note)); McInnis v. A.M.F., Inc., 765 F.2d 240, 247 (1st Cir. 
1985) (noting that evidence obtained from compromise negotiations “is of questionable 
relevance on the issue of liability or the value of a claim, since settlement may well re-
flect a desire for peaceful dispute resolution, rather than the litigants’ perceptions of 
the strength or weakness of their relative positions”); United States v. Contra Costa 
County Water Dist., 678 F.2d 90, 92 (9th Cir. 1982) (noting that such evidence is “irrele-
vant as being motivated by a desire for peace rather than from a concession of the me-
rits of the claim” (citing FED. R. EVID. 408 advisory committee’s note)).   
54 332 F.3d at 981. 
55 Id. (quoting Cook v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 132 F.R.D. 548, 554 (E.D. Cal. 1990)). 
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These policy considerations noted by both the Rules Advisory 
Committee and the Goodyear court are quite understandable.  During 
a settlement negotiation, a party may well be willing to make certain 
admissions or concessions solely for the purpose of bringing about a 
speedy or cost-effective solution to a dispute.  Rather than maintain-
ing a truthful or principled stance regarding actual liability, a party 
may bend and waver for a number of reasons that have nothing to do 
with underlying guilt or innocence.  The party may simply want to 
avoid the hassle, bad publicity, or significant cost that litigation may 
entail, and she may say or do anything to bring about such a result.  
Because there is thus an “inherent questionability of the truthful-
ness”56 of any communications that such a party would make in fur-
therance of the settlement, it is in the interest of good public policy to 
ensure that an individual is not exposed to liability on the basis of 
these questionable statements. 
If the courts are genuinely concerned with the inherent truthful-
ness of statements made in the pursuit of settlement, then such a poli-
cy consideration must necessarily extend to the type of statements at 
issue here.  Whether a party engages in settlement communications 
with another party or nonparty, the underlying motivation is the very 
desire for settlement that offers little utility in attributing liability.57  
That is, the very nature of a settlement communication is of question-
able probative value because it may be motivated by factors indepen-
dent of any inherent truth.  So long as an individual communicates 
with a nonparty in genuine furtherance of a settlement with a party, 
the truthfulness of such communications is as suspect as if the indi-
vidual were communicating with the party directly.  There is no logical 
distinction between these two cases with regard to this specific policy 
motivation, as there is no reason to believe that the latter communica-
tions would have greater probative value than the former. 
Thus, to the extent that courts are concerned about the future 
admission of statements made for the “unique purpose of settlement 
negotiations,”58 such concern should apply to all such statements of-
fered for the “unique purpose of settlement.”  This category certainly 
covers communications made by a party to a nonparty in furtherance 
of a settlement with another party, because the Rule is principally 
concerned with the type of statement to be protected. 
 
56 Id.  
57 See supra text accompanying note 17. 
58 Goodyear, 332 F.3d at 981 (quoting Cook, 132 F.R.D. at 554). 
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2.  Promoting Judicial Efficiency Through Settlement 
Far beyond providing a check against the suspect evidentiary value 
of settlement communications, the overwhelming purpose of Rule 
408—as acknowledged by both the drafters of the Rule and the courts 
of appeals applying it—is to encourage the settlement of lawsuits in 
order to advance judicial efficiency.59  The primary goal of the enact-
ment of Rule 408 was to encourage the promotion of the public policy 
favoring the compromise and settlement of disputes that would oth-
erwise be discouraged with the admission of such evidence.60  The 
federal courts of appeals have acknowledged this foundational policy 
and its underlying utility.61  In recognizing the settlement privilege 
 
59 See supra text accompanying note 18. 
60 See FED. R. EVID. 408 advisory committee’s note (calling the promotion of public 
policy favoring settlement a “more consistently impressive ground” for the Rule than 
the reliability of evidence produced during settlement). 
61 See EEOC v. UMB Bank Fin. Corp., 558 F.3d 784, 791 (8th Cir. 2009) (noting 
that the purpose of Rule 408 is “to foster open discussions and out-of-court settle-
ments” (citing FED. R. EVID. 408 advisory committee’s note)); Stockman v. Oakcrest 
Dental Ctr., P.C., 480 F.3d 791, 805 (6th Cir. 2007) (arguing that the purpose of Rule 
408 is “the promotion of the public policy favoring the compromise and settlement of 
disputes that would otherwise be discouraged with the admission of such evidence” 
(citation omitted)); United States v. Arias, 431 F.3d 1327, 1337 (11th Cir. 2005) (not-
ing that one of the justifications for Rule 408 is that “the exclusion promotes settle-
ment of disputes” (citing FED. R. EVID. 408 advisory committee’s note)); Zurich Am. 
Ins. Co. v. Watts Indus., Inc., 417 F.3d 682, 689 (7th Cir. 2005) (“The primary policy 
reason for excluding settlement communications is that the law favors out-of-court set-
tlements, and allowing offers of compromise to be used as admissions of liability might 
chill voluntary efforts at dispute resolution.”); EEOC v. Gear Petroleum, Inc., 948 F.2d 
1542, 1545-46 (10th Cir. 1991) (“The philosophy of the Rule is to allow the parties to 
drop their guard and to talk freely and loosely without fear that a concession made to 
advance negotiations will be used at trial.” (quoting STEVEN A. SALTZBURG & KENNETH 
R. REDDEN, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 286 (4th ed. 1986))); Trebor 
Sportswear Co. v. Ltd. Stores, Inc., 865 F.2d 506, 510 (2d Cir. 1989) (acknowledging 
that Rule 408 supports the “public policy of encouraging settlements and avoiding 
wasteful litigation”); Fiberglass Insulators, Inc. v. Dupuy, 856 F.2d 652, 654 (4th Cir. 
1988) (“The public policy of favoring and encouraging settlement makes necessary the 
inadmissibility of settlement negotiations in order to foster frank discussions.”); McIn-
nis v. A.M.F., Inc., 765 F.2d 240, 247 (1st Cir. 1985) (noting that “the rule illustrates 
Congress’ desire to promote a public policy favoring the compromise and settlement 
of claims by insulating potential litigants from later being penalized in court for their 
attempts to first resolve their dispute out of court”); In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Anti-
trust Litig., 723 F.2d 238, 273 n.39 (3d Cir. 1983) (“Chief Judge Seitz believes that it is 
the purpose of Rule 408 to encourage settlements by shielding the parties to a settle-
ment from liability based on the fact of settlement or on statements made in settle-
ment negotiations.”), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Ze-
nith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986); United States v. Contra Costa County Water 
Dist., 678 F.2d 90, 92 (9th Cir. 1982) (“By preventing settlement negotiations from be-
ing admitted as evidence, full and open disclosure is encouraged, thereby furthering 
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under Rule 501, the Sixth Circuit noted that the privilege shared Rule 
408’s goal of promoting a “public policy favoring secret negotia-
tions.”62  It argued that “[t]he ability to negotiate and settle a case 
without trial fosters a more efficient, more cost-effective, and signifi-
cantly less burdened judicial system.”63  In order to attain this goal, 
parties must be allowed “to make hypothetical concessions, offer crea-
tive quid pro quos, and generally make statements that would otherwise 
belie their litigation efforts” without fear that such information may 
later be used against them.64 
It seems that protecting a party’s settlement communications with 
a nonparty could only encourage the settlement of lawsuits.  There are 
certainly times when an interested nonparty to a lawsuit may be vital to 
the success of any settlement negotiations that take place.65  If such ne-
gotiations would leave parties open to future liability, however, it would 
seriously limit their ability to compromise on any aspect of the claim, as 
they would be forced to entertain an understandable worry.  In order 
to promote the public policy favoring the settlement of such disputes, 
the federal courts should be eager to ensure that the party has the ne-
cessary freedom of discussion with regard to compromises. 
As a concrete example of how the protection of such nonparty 
communications would further the foundational public policy goals of 
this Rule, recall the previous discussion of NASCAR, Bruton Smith, 
and Kentucky Speedway.66  Without a successful settlement, the com-
plicated antitrust case between NASCAR and Kentucky Speedway 
would certainly have led to a more “burdened” Sixth Circuit.67  A set-
tlement seemingly would have been impossible without the interven-
tion of Bruton Smith, a nonparty to the litigation.68  Such an arrange-
ment of three distinct individuals seeking their own advancement 
while incidentally benefiting the entire court system seems to be the 
 
the policy toward settlement.”); Ramada Dev. Co. v. Rauch, 644 F.2d 1097, 1106 (5th 
Cir. Unit B May 1981) (“This rule is designed to encourage settlements by fostering 
free and full discussion of the issues.”).  
62 Goodyear, 332 F.3d at 981. 
63 Id. at 980. 
64 Id.  
65 See, e.g., supra notes 1-13 and accompanying text.  
66 Id. 
67 See Goodyear, 332 F.3d at 980 (“The ability to negotiate and settle a case without 
trial fosters a . . . significantly less burdened judicial system.”). 
68 Without Smith, Kentucky would have had nothing to gain and thus no substan-
tial reason to agree to a settlement with NASCAR. 
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very type of “creative quid pro quos”69 that the courts seek to encourage.  
Furthermore, it cannot seriously be doubted that this settlement ar-
rangement would “otherwise be discouraged with the admission of 
such evidence.”70  NASCAR would likely never have dared to make the 
necessary concessions or admissions that such negotiations involve to 
either Kentucky Speedway or Bruton Smith if there were a risk that a 
different speedway could subsequently use such statements as proof of 
liability.  Thus, the protection of communications made by parties to 
nonparties to a dispute furthers the public policy encouraging the set-
tlement of lawsuits, and the absence of such protection would weaken 
that policy’s goal. 
C.  Similar Cases 
While the federal courts of appeals thus acknowledge the powerful 
foundational policies at the heart of Rule 408,71 such broad considera-
tions alone do not provide sufficient guidance to practitioners con-
cerned with the specific scope of a circuit court’s application of the 
Rule.  Indeed, in discussing the goals of Rule 408, the courts have 
noted that it would be erroneous to take the view that “any recognition 
of statements made during settlement will ruin the freedom of com-
munication with respect to compromise that the Rule protects.”72  Al-
though the federal courts of appeals have yet to entertain a case specif-
ically concerning whether the scope of Rule 408 encompasses 
communications made by a party to a nonparty in furtherance of set-
tlement, an examination of how the courts have dealt with similar am-
biguities under the Rule suggests that the Rule’s protection would ex-
tend to such circumstances. 
1.  Internal Work Product 
The most significant support for extending Rule 408’s protection 
to the issue is found within the courts of appeals’ treatment of a par-
ty’s internal work product, which—while prepared in furtherance of 
settlement—was never intended to be communicated to the opposing 
party.  Despite the fact that Rule 408 does not directly address this sit-
 
69 Goodyear, 332 F.3d at 980. 
70 Stockman v. Oakcrest Dental Ctr., P.C., 480 F.3d 791, 805 (6th Cir. 2007) (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted).  
71 See supra notes 53, 61.   
72 Rhoades v. Avon Prods., Inc., 504 F.3d 1151, 1161 (9th Cir. 2007) (emphasis 
added) (internal quotation marks omitted).   
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uation, several circuits have found that the Rule affords protection to 
such internal communications regarding settlement, whether they are 
formal memoranda,73 reports,74 accounting materials,75 or even hand-
written notes prepared informally.76  Such decisions are especially sig-
nificant to this Comment’s issue because they suggest that these courts 
are more concerned with promoting the underlying policy considera-
tions behind Rule 408 than they are with limiting the Rule’s applica-
tion to communications directly between parties. 
In the most recent treatment of internal work product, the Eighth 
Circuit has echoed the Third, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits’ sentiments 
in stating that the spirit of Rule 408, “as recognized by several cir-
cuits . . . , supports the exclusion of certain work product . . . created 
specifically for the purpose of conciliation, even if not communicated 
to the other party.”77  In dealing with the ambiguity, the court noted 
that the purposes of the Rule were “to foster open discussions and out-
of-court settlements and to guard against the admission of evidence 
that may not fairly represent the actual value or merits of a claim.”78  
Given that protecting internal work product would further the policy 
goals of Rule 408, the court noted that it found the other circuits’ rea-
soning persuasive and agreed that it was “appropriate to view Rule 408 
as being sufficiently broad to encompass” the internally communi-
cated material.79 
It is reasonable to believe that the courts of appeals that have ac-
knowledged the applicability of Rule 408 to internal settlement com-
munications based on policy considerations would also find the Rule 
applicable to the issue here.  The previous discussion already found 
that nonparty settlement communications significantly further the 
 
73 See Affiliated Mfrs., Inc. v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 56 F.3d 521, 528-30 (3d Cir. 
1995) (holding that Rule 408 bars the admission of internal memoranda prepared for 
settlement negotiations). 
74 See Ramada Dev. Co. v. Rauch, 644 F.2d 1097, 1107 (5th Cir. Unit B May 1981) 
(holding that an internal report “made in the course of an effort to compromise” was 
properly excluded under Rule 408). 
75 See Blu-J, Inc. v. Kemper C.P.A. Group, 916 F.2d 637, 641-42 (11th Cir. 1990) 
(holding that an accountant’s report prepared for the purpose of compromise negoti-
ations was properly excluded).  
76 See EEOC v. UMB Bank Fin. Corp., 558 F.3d 784, 791 (8th Cir. 2009) (holding 
that Rule 408 applied to a “handwritten . . . document memorializing notes” taken by a 
job counselor while discussing damages “as part of the conciliation process”). 
77 Id.  
78 Id. (citing FED. R. EVID. 408 advisory committee’s note). 
79 Id.  
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policy goals at the foundation of Rule 408,80 and there does not ap-
pear to be a relevant distinction between the preparation of an inter-
nal memorandum and an external memorandum to a nonparty if they 
are both in furtherance of settlement with the other party to the dis-
pute.  The courts’ strong emphasis on policy and their unwillingness 
to draw the line with particular relationships demonstrate their con-
cern for promoting the settlement of lawsuits and for protecting 
communications that are genuinely in furtherance of such settlement.  
Thus, one could reasonably expect courts that apply Rule 408 to in-
ternal settlement communications to likewise apply the Rule to non-
party communications in furtherance of settlement. 
2.  Third-Party Settlements 
Several of the federal courts of appeals have held that Rule 408 is 
applicable to settlement communications between a party to a dispute 
and an adverse nonparty entering the original dispute.81  Recall, of 
course, that such a situation is conceptually distinct from the one 
here.82  For instance, if Bruton Smith decided to sue NASCAR with 
claims arising from its original dispute with Kentucky Speedway, then 
these courts would hold that NASCAR’s communications in further-
ance of a settlement with Bruton Smith would be afforded protection, 
as these two would now effectively be parties to a new dispute.  Here, 
in contrast, the concern is NASCAR’s communications with a nonpar-
ty, with which it has no dispute, in furtherance of a settlement with 
the party to the original dispute. 
The significance of these decisions lies not in the specific facts of 
the cases but rather in the reasoning that the courts employed in or-
der to address the ambiguity in Rule 408.  In McInnis v. A.M.F., Inc., 
 
80 See supra Section II.B.  
81 See, e.g., Hudspeth v. Comm’r, 914 F.2d 1207, 1213-14 (9th Cir. 1990) (finding 
that the plaintiffs’ “contention that Rule 408 does not apply when third party com-
promises are involved is not tenable” because of the Rule’s underlying policy); McInnis 
v. A.M.F., Inc., 765 F.2d 240, 247 (1st Cir. 1985) (noting that while “[t]he settlement 
agreement at issue here was entered into between a litigant and a third party, rather 
than between the two litigants themselves, . . . the policies underlying the exclusionary 
rule are equally applicable to such a situation”).  While the D.C. Circuit has not specif-
ically addressed this issue, its district courts have looked favorably on similar decisions 
by other circuits.  See, e.g., C & E Servs., Inc. v. Ashland Inc., 539 F. Supp. 2d 316, 319-
20 (D.D.C. 2008) (citing other circuits and noting that “[t]he very policy underlying 
Rule 408 would be defeated if it did not operate to preclude the admissibility of set-
tlement discussions in a case involving another party or another claim”). 
82 See supra text accompanying notes 23-24. 
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for instance, the First Circuit was forced to confront the issue of 
whether “a plaintiff who ha[d] accepted payment from a third party 
against whom he ha[d] a claim” was entitled to Rule 408’s protec-
tion.83  After initially determining that the Rule’s policy called for the 
protection of third-party compromise negotiations generally, it con-
fronted the novel issue of a plaintiff’s compromise84 by turning to the 
twin policy goals underlying Rule 408.  Because failing to extend Rule 
408 to such a case would “discourage settlements” and be of question-
able “relevance . . . to the validity of the claim,” the court found the 
plaintiff’s compromise negotiations inadmissible.85  In so doing, the 
court noted that “[i]f the policies underlying Rule 408 mandate that 
settlements may not be admitted” in the traditional case, then “it is 
axiomatic that those policies likewise prohibit the admission of set-
tlement evidence” in the novel case of a plaintiff’s settlement.86 
It is reasonable to believe that the courts of appeals that have spe-
cifically acknowledged an ambiguity in Rule 408’s treatment of third-
party settlement negotiations arising from the initial dispute and that 
have addressed this ambiguity by appealing to policy considerations 
would look favorably on the issue here.  Even when courts have failed 
to extend the Rule’s protection to such a situation, it has often been 
because “the settlement communications at issue arise out of a dispute 
distinct from the one for which the evidence is being offered.”87  The 
situation at issue here, however, deals with communications to a non-
party in furtherance of a settlement of the same dispute.  Given the 
previous discussion of how such nonparty settlement communications 
would further the foundational policy of the Rule,88 these courts 
would likely support the applicability of Rule 408 to this issue. 
3.  Purposes Other than Settlement 
In addition to courts of appeals extending the applicability of 
Rule 408 beyond its text to communications in furtherance of settle-
 
83 765 F.2d at 247. 
84 The court acknowledged that other courts extending Rule 408 to cover third-
party compromises generally dealt with “agreements between a defendant and a third 
party to compromise a claim arising out of the same transaction as the one being liti-
gated,” rather than agreements with a plaintiff.  Id. 
85 Id. at 247-48. 
86 Id. at 247. 
87 Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. Watts Indus., Inc., 417 F.3d 682, 689 (7th Cir. 2005); see 
also id. at 689-90 (finding that evidence regarding the settlement of a claim different 
from the one litigated was properly admitted).  
88 See supra Section II.B.  
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ment when conducive to policy goals, some courts have gone so far as 
to apply the Rule to communications that could only vaguely be con-
strued as used for settlement purposes.  In EEOC v. Gear Petroleum, Inc., 
for instance, the Tenth Circuit acknowledged that a letter appeared to 
be intended more for investigation purposes than for conciliation, but 
it nonetheless allowed the letter to fall under the general umbrella of 
a settlement communication, finding that “when the issue is doubtful, 
the better practice is to exclude evidence of compromises or com-
promise offers.”89  Furthermore, once a document has been deemed a 
settlement communication, other courts of appeals have demonstrat-
ed that the seriousness of Rule 408’s foundational public policy super-
sedes competing interests.90 
Because the primary concern of this Comment is to analyze 
whether communications to nonparties in furtherance of party set-
tlement constitute compromise negotiations under Rule 408, the opi-
nions of these circuits are, admittedly, not particularly helpful.  None-
theless, they demonstrate that the courts are willing to transcend the 
textual confines of Rule 408 and decide cases with overwhelming de-
ference to the encouragement of settlement negotiations.  
4.  Mediation in the Sixth Circuit 
Given the Sixth Circuit’s recognition of a broad settlement privi-
lege above and beyond Rule 408, it is not surprising that a practitioner 
confronted with this Comment’s issue would likely fare well in that 
circuit.  Because the Sixth Circuit’s broad respect for the secrecy of 
settlement communications echoes that of other circuits, however, 
and because the Sixth Circuit’s district courts’ specific reasoning with 
regard to mediation is fascinating for this issue, Sixth Circuit case law 
is nonetheless worth examining in more detail. 
A recent Sixth Circuit district court opinion, Irwin Seating Co. v. 
IBM Corp., recognized that, under the local court rules, “[a]ll ADR [al-
ternative dispute resolution] proceedings are considered to be com-
 
89 948 F.2d 1542, 1544-46 (10th Cir. 1991) (quoting Bradbury v. Phillips Petro-
leum Co., 815 F.2d 1356, 1364 (10th Cir. 1987)).  
90 See Trebor Sportswear Co. v. Ltd. Stores, Inc., 865 F.2d 506, 509-11 (2d Cir. 
1989) (citing the powerful public policy behind Rule 408 and finding that documents 
introduced to satisfy the statute of frauds were to be excluded because they were origi-
nally settlement communications); Fiberglass Insulators, Inc. v. Dupuy, 856 F.2d 652, 
653-55 (4th Cir. 1988) (noting that the public policy behind Rule 408 necessitates that 
the Rule be “broader than the common law exclusionary rule” and “exclude[] from 
evidence all statements made in the course of settlement negotiations” despite compet-
ing interests in admitting evidence).   
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promise negotiations within the meaning of Federal Rules [sic] of 
Evidence 408.”91  The court noted that the scope of Rule 408’s protec-
tion includes a party’s communications to an ADR mediator in fur-
therance of a settlement with another party.92  While the concept of 
the mediation privilege is distinct from this Comment’s inquiry, the 
inclusion of the mediator under Rule 408 suggests that these district 
courts intend to give parties enormous latitude to involve nonparties 
in the mediation and settlement process.  In fact, the court noted that 
such negotiations need not be conducted “under the auspices of the 
court” because the same public interest is served when they are con-
ducted “informally between the parties.”93  Based on this criterion, it 
would seem that the courts could allow for an almost unlimited variety 
of nonparty interventions, as they appear more concerned with en-
couraging and protecting settlement communications than they are 
with limiting communications based on relationships. 
Irwin also made clear that the settlement privilege from Goodyear 
would not be narrowly tailored to the facts supporting the latter’s hold-
ing.  In Irwin, the plaintiff’s expert witnesses learned of, and disclosed 
in their reports, settlement communications made by the defendant; 
the plaintiff was thus sanctioned by the magistrate judge for violating 
the Goodyear settlement privilege.94  On appeal, the court explained 
that “[t]he fact that the Sixth Circuit did not approve the identical 
sanction does not demonstrate the unreasonableness of the sanction 
imposed in this case”; the experts had disturbed the sanctity of a set-
tlement negotiation, and no alternative sanction would suffice.95  While 
the circumstances were different from those of this Comment’s specific 
inquiry, the district court demonstrated an intent to broadly protect 
communications in furtherance of settlement. 
Thus, unsurprisingly, it is likely that the Court of Appeals for the 
Sixth Circuit and its district courts would look favorably on nonparty 
settlement communications in furtherance of party settlement.  Giv-
 
91 No. 04-0568, 2007 WL 518866, at *3 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 15, 2007) (quoting what 
was then the Western District of Michigan’s Local Rule 16.2(e)). 
92 See id. (“[I]nformation disclosed during the ADR process shall not be revealed 
to any one [sic] else . . . .” (quoting what was then the Western District of Michigan’s 
Local Rule 16.2(e))). 
93 Id. at *3 (emphasis added) (quoting Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Chiles 
Power Supply, Inc., 332 F.3d 976, 980 (6th Cir. 2003)). 
94 See id. at *1 (“The Magistrate Judge reasoned that, regardless of whether Plain-
tiff acted with bad faith, Plaintiff was solely at fault for the breach of confidentiality 
. . . [and] the only appropriate remedy was to strike Plaintiff’s expert witnesses.”).  
95 Id. at *4.  
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en that this circuit has continually espoused protection for settle-
ment communications with virtually no limitation, it is reasonable to 
believe that Rule 408 would apply to the communications at issue in 
the Sixth Circuit. 
III.  THE FINAL LAP:  RECOMMENDATIONS TO PRACTITIONERS 
While there is an unfortunate absence of direct authority offering 
counsel to practitioners seeking to engage in settlement communica-
tions with nonparties to their dispute, the weight of the available au-
thority is sufficient to derive a number of conclusions.  Broadly speak-
ing, the text of Rule 408 does not facially prohibit nonparty settlement 
communications, and the previous discussion of policy suggests that in 
the federal courts of appeals there will be a significant presumption in 
favor of encouraging the settlement of lawsuits.96  Further, the analysis 
of the applicability of the Rule in the federal courts of appeals leads to 
more specific recommendations. 
Practitioners should feel most comfortable engaging in nonparty 
settlement communications in the Third, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and 
Eleventh Circuits.  Given that the Sixth Circuit has recognized a gen-
eral settlement privilege and has broadly and continually stated its in-
tent to protect communications in furtherance of settlement, it would 
be extremely unlikely for a judge in that circuit to hold that either 
Rule 408 or the settlement privilege does not apply to this situation.  
Though the Third, Fifth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits have yet to go 
as far as the Sixth, their acknowledgement of the applicability of Rule 
408 to internal work product that is not communicated to a party in 
the dispute—and their reliance on the policy behind the Rule—is suf-
ficiently analogous to create a high likelihood of a favorable outcome. 
Practitioners should also feel reasonably comfortable engaging in 
such communications in the First and Ninth Circuits.  It is reasonable 
to assume that these courts, which have specifically appealed to policy 
considerations in confronting the ambiguity in Rule 408’s treatment 
of third-party settlement negotiations arising from the initial dispute, 
would also appeal to policy considerations if confronted with this is-
sue.  Because the policy argument is strong, the courts would likely be 
supportive of extending protection to such communications. 
Practitioners in the remaining circuits do not have enough case law 
to make a confident decision.  Because the Tenth Circuit has held that 
 
96 See supra note 61 and accompanying text.  
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communications even vaguely in furtherance of settlement will be pro-
tected, there is a strong argument that its obvious encouragement of 
settlement would lead to a positive outcome in this situation.  Similarly, 
because the Second and Fourth Circuits have given Rule 408’s policy 
interests great deference in the face of competing interests, there is a 
good argument that they would do the same in this case.  Because these 
decisions dealt exclusively with parties to the litigation, however, the 
decisions are not sufficiently analogous to warrant deference. 
Although the Seventh Circuit certainly has not put forth any opi-
nions that would run contrary to protecting the communications at 
issue, it has not touched upon anything remotely analogous to non-
party settlement communications, and practitioners should thus pro-
ceed with caution.  In addition, while the decisions of the D.C. Cir-
cuit’s district courts could logically be grouped with those of the First 
and Ninth Circuits, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit has not 
itself addressed the issue. 
Finally, aside from these specific recommendations, it should be 
reiterated that the courts of appeals have acknowledged a broad policy 
of encouraging the settlement of lawsuits.  Thus, even where there is 
not enough case law on which to base an adequate suggestion, it would 
not be unreasonable for practitioners to engage in such communica-
tions if the communications would otherwise be particularly advanta-
geous.  Given that the text of Rule 408 suggests that any genuine set-
tlement negotiation is protected, that the two distinct policy goals at the 
foundation of the Rule are better served by the extension of its scope to 
nonparties, and that the federal courts have protected settlement 
communications in a wide variety of different circumstances, communi-
cations made to nonparties could reasonably be entertained if they are 
undertaken in genuine furtherance of settlement. 
CONCLUSION 
In the end, Kentucky Speedway and NASCAR never came to a set-
tlement agreement, and the Sixth Circuit eventually affirmed the dis-
trict court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of NASCAR.97  Per-
haps the outcome would have been different if the parties had been 
assured that any and all of their settlement negotiations would be pro-
tected by the Federal Rules of Evidence.  In any event, if the public 
policy encouraging the settlement of lawsuits is as important as both 
 
97 Ky. Speedway, LLC v. NASCAR, 558 F.3d 908, 921 (6th Cir. 2009). 
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the courts and the literature suggest, then it is essential that practi-
tioners be provided the means by which to become aware of the true 
scope of the settlement negotiations covered by Rule 408, including 
those regarding nonparties to a lawsuit. 
While the principal goal of this Comment is to provide some direc-
tion to practitioners frustrated by the ambiguity of nonparty settlement 
negotiations under the Federal Rules, my hope is that others will soon 
confront this issue and elaborate on my analysis in a more sophisti-
cated way.  Settlement negotiations occur too often and are too impor-
tant to the federal system to allow for such an ambiguity to continue 
enjoying uncritical deference in the literature. 
 
